



H-ISAC™

HEALTH - ISAC



Overview

Denise Anderson – President & CEO H-ISAC

Why ISACs?

- ❖ **Trusted** entities established by CI/KR owners and operators.
- ❖ Comprehensive **sector** analysis aggregation /anonymization
- ❖ **Reach**-within their sectors, with other sectors, and with government to share critical information.
- ❖ **All-hazards** approach
- ❖ **Threat** level **determination** for sector
- ❖ **Operational**-timely accurate actionable



Why ISACs?

- Most ISACs have global members and operations
- Most ISACs are not-for-profit (501c6 or 501c3)
- Most ISACs are private sector organizations that rely on member dues for funding
- ISACs collaborate through the NCI



H-ISAC

Founded in 2010


Global Member Organizations:

- Providers
- Health System Payers
- EHR/EMR Developers
- Lab/Radiological
- Biotech/Pharma
- Academia
- Medical Device Manufacturers
- Pharmacy



Trust community, forum for information sharing including:

- Situational Awareness,
- Threats,
- Vulnerabilities,
- Best Practices
- Mitigation Strategies



← Malicious Activity Targeting COVID-19 Research Vaccine Development

1 Attachment(s)

TLP
GREEN

Category
Threat Bulletins

Published
Jul 16, 2020, 01:56 PM

Report Source(s)
Government Agency

Alert ID
7a09b636

Tags (Add to channels)
APT29

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HEALTH - ISAC

CELEBRATING 10 YEARS

The United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) made an assessment that APT29 (also known as 'the Dukes' or 'Cozy Bear') is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services. The United States' National Security Agency (NSA) agrees with this attribution and the details provided in this report.

The group uses a variety of tools and techniques to predominantly target governmental, diplomatic, think-tank, healthcare and energy targets for intelligence gain.

Throughout 2020, APT29 has targeted various organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, highly likely with the intention of stealing information and intellectual property relating to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines.

H-ISAC Threat Operations Center (TOC)

Dedicated staff of security analysts, an extension of the security team



2020 Statistics


- Victim notifications - **798**
- Threat Bulletins - **77**
- Vulnerability Bulletins - **51**
- Member shared IOCs - **185,413**




Information Sources



H-ISAC Operations



Global Communications



Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, Incidents

- ✓ Malicious Sites
- ✓ Threat Actors, Objectives
- ✓ Threat Indicators
- ✓ TTPs, Observables
- ✓ Courses of Action
- ✓ Exploit Targets
- ✓ Attacks
- ✓ Malicious Emails:
Phishing/ Spearphishing
- ✓ Software Vulnerabilities
- ✓ Malicious Software
- ✓ Analysis and risk mitigation
- ✓ Incident response



Primary Ways Information Is Shared With Members/Partners

- ✓ Portal/Alerts
- ✓ Listservers/Secure Chat
- ✓ Automation
- ✓ Briefings
- ✓ Daily Products, Alerts and Bulletins
- ✓ Monthly Threat Briefings
- ✓ Cyber Threat Level

For Public: H-ISAC.ORG

BazarCall Targets Healthcare Entities



The operators of the BazarLoader malware are working together with underground call centers to trick the victims of their spam campaigns into opening malicious Office documents and infecting themselves with malware. The new malware was discovered being distributed by call centers in late January and is named BazarCall, or BazaCall, as the threat actors initially used it to install the BazarLoader malware.



While this is not the first time when cybercrime gangs have worked together with underground call centers, this is the first time when we see a major malware distributor, such as the BazarLoader gang, use this tactic on a large scale.

Like many malware campaigns, BazarCall starts with a phishing email but from there deviates to a novel distribution method; using phone call centers to distribute malicious Excel documents that install malware.


The emails then prompt the user to contact a listed phone number to cancel the

Other H-ISAC Intelligence Offerings

- Daily Reports
 - -Cyber and Physical
- Surveys
- Table-Top Exercises
- After Action Reports
- Patch Tuesday podcasts
- Weekly IOC Report
- Hacking Healthcare
- Partner Reports – Flashpoint, Intel 471, Advintel



H-ISAC White Papers



Networking/Collaborating


- ✓ Educational Events
- ✓ Committees & Working Groups
- ✓ Community Shared Services
- ✓ Exercises






Threat Landscape for the Health Sector





Remember This?





It's Now This...



It Started with A Good Idea



13-50 years=200 million




HITECH ACT of 2009

Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health ACT

- Financial Incentives and Penalties
- Focus on Data and Privacy

.....Not on Cybersecurity



Other Factors

- ❑ Realization of the value of the data
- ❑ Technology Evolution – Medical Devices
- ❑ Evolution of Actors and Threats
- ❑ Nature of Healthcare:

- Paper to Data
- Connecting to the Internet
- Data Portability
- Lack of Cyber Security Expertise
- Thin Margins – End of Life
- 24-Hour Operations

- Open Environment
- Compliance Culture
- Silos Between:
 - Staff
 - Divisions/Functions
 - MDMs/HDOs




Incidents



Timeline of Ransomware Attacks

of Ransomware Attacks on US Healthcare Organizations and Patient Records Affected by Year



Comparitech.com 3/10/21

Ransomware Trends

- Targets have Evolved
- Specialized Marketplace
- Ransomware as a Service
- Extortion and DDoS
- Reconnaissance
- Multiple Malware
- MSSPs
- Prices Climbing




Other Threat Trends in the Healthcare Sector

- Third Party Risk and Concentration Risk
- Insider Threat
- Blended Threats
- BEC
- Social Engineering
- Remote work environment/Telehealth
- **Phishing**
- Vulnerabilities (many critical) & Network Scanning
 - Citrix, MS (printer nightmare), Pulse VPN, RDP
- Physical/Blended



It's Not About the Ones & Zeroes



The Future



What Can We Do?

- Enterprise Risk Management – Crown Jewels
- Understand Environment/Threat Surface
- Board and Executive Support/Commitment
- Patching and Budget Cycles
- Threat Intelligence/Situational Awareness – Information Sharing
- Ecosystem Training/Awareness
- Tear Down Silos



Summary

- Old Threats Still Exist – Can't Ignore
- Need to Stay Abreast of Evolving Threats
- All-Hazards, Enterprise Risk Management Approach
- Cascading Impacts - Ecosystem
- Same Team
- Share, Share, Share



Thank you!

